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former are historic developments, while the latter are fundamental biological functions.
A similar distinction holds in psychology, though the parallel is by no means complete, owing to the different character of the sciences. A comparative study of mind shows that the processes to which, as it happens, most emphasis has been given in introspective psychology are merely special adaptations to the environment in which conscious beings chance to be placed; the same study, carefully followed out, will reveal, I believe, underlying these, certain fundamental functions which belong to the nature of mental life and to whose operation every phenomenon of consciousness can be traced. The purpose of the present paper is to distinguish between these two sorts of ' function ' and to examine briefly the nature and r61e of the latter.
The usual systematic treatment of psychology lays too much emphasis on the particular senses. The analysis of the qualities, intensities, and mutual relations of sensations, important though it be from the psychophysical standpoint, is not one of the prime questions of psychology proper. That light and sound, for instance, are practically universal features of our physical environment, does not make vision and hearing essential mental functions. Even were these senses universal among conscious beings (which they are not), they could give no clue to the ultimate constitution of ' mentality.' The fact that we have visual and auditory experiences, instead of magnetic and what not, is a matter of psychophysical natural history only. The analytic psychologist should distinguish between the intrinsic characters of consciousness and the special forms and processes which it manifests. In making our analysis of the nature of mind the only questions which bear on sensory experience are, ' How does the mind come to have sensations (when stimuli produce activity in the brain) ?' and, ' How do these sensory experiences come to differ (as the modes of stimulation differ) ?' The assistance afforded by physiological research is sufficiently acknowledged in the second part of each question, though I believe the psychological investigation can be carried on without it. In any case, the analysis of particular sensation data has no bearing on the problem.
Similarly, the distinction between sensation and memory is solely a question of natural history. Experiences based on the central revival process and experiences based on sense stimulation present no other sort of differences than can be found among the various types of the latter. The gradual passing of sensation through after-image into memory-image, and the notable instances of confusion between sensa-tions and memories, make it impossible to regard the processes involved as fundamentally different in character. The descriptive treatment of memory seems to belong naturally with sensation, or at least immediately after it -not after perception; the rise of memory requires no new function : simple memory experiences, as psychological data, result from the same sort of operations as sensation experiences.
Nor does the distinction between cognitive, affective, and conative ' sides of consciousness' or any other division along similar lines afford a satisfactory clue to the ultimate mental functions. For, while it may serve to demarcate certain distinctive classes of experience, the processes concerned in the production of these data are either psychologically equivalent or they are complex. That such a division does not rest on any fundamental distinction in mental function a cursory examination will suffice, I think, to show.
The conative side of consciousness in its simpler forms has been traced to kinajsthetic sensations with accompanying motor phenomena. The latter element is not an experience at all -it is purely physiological. And in the nature of the kinaesthetic sensations there is nothing fundamentally different from other sensations : muscle sensations differ from visual just as visual differ from auditory, if we consider the psychological aspect only. This does not lessen the peculiar importance of conative experience in determining some of the higher forms of consciousness (voluntary attention and voluntary activity) ; but it points to the need of another starting-point to explain this evolution.
Turning to affective or hedonic consciousness, the line of demarcation between feeling and sensation has never been drawn to the satisfaction of many psychologists, including the present writer. Admitting fully the distinction between physical pain (Schmerz) and unpleasantness (Unlust), I still cannot see wherein the Lust-Unlust experience itself is essentially different from certain other experiences which are classed as sensations or revivals-for example, the margin of the visual field and the temporal setting of memory-images. Whether the affective datum be regarded as an experience standing by itself (feeling) or as a character of experiences (tone), it is sensory in character: feeling can be attributed to systemic sensations; the hedonic tone of sensations is due to a margin or fringe of systemic sensations, and ideal hedonic tone to a memory fringe of the same sort. The distinction between affective and cognitive phenomena, then, is not psychological, but rests on a difference in the biological data : ' affective stimuli' are physiological processes, ' cognitive stimuli' are aspects of the physical environment.
Having noted the essential similarity of the conative and affective data to the cognitive, it remains to bring out the general relationship of the three." The distinguishing mark of cognition is its presentative nature; and for the most part the senses which offer this characteristic are the ' external' ones. The distinction between cognitive, affective, and conative consciousness can be said, then, to correspond in a general way to the difference between the external, systemic, and kinssthetic senses: the first give experiences of the outer world ; the second keep us in touch with the state of our own organism; the third supply experiences of the motor life and thus form the basis of voluntarj' activity. Whether I have drawn the limits exactly or not, the threefold division rests on biological differences; psychologically, the differences separating the three classes of data are similar to other sensation differences; the three classes are therefore not due to the separate operation of three distinct mental functions.
A word is in place here on Brentano's classification, which presents certain distinctive features. In the first place he groups feeling and conation together as phenomena of attraction and repulsion (Phanomene der Liebe und des Hasses) ; and in the second place he introduces a new class in the shape of judgments (Urtheile). His basis is the attitude of consciousness towards its objects: the data are either simply presented, or judged (reflected upon), or actively liked or disliked. I have already pointed out that affective and conative phenomena, so far as they are data of consciousness, involve nothing essentially different from presentations, so that I cannot regard his first and third classes as psychologically distinct. But Brentano's arguments for regarding the judgment psychosis as a distinct type of experience appeal to me very strongly, and as a matter of fact have had much to do with developing the view to be presented in the rest of this paper. His chief mistake, which is the mistake of the other classifications as well, is the endeavor to account for each sort of experience by a single function only, and to attribute to each function but one sort of experience. Judgment (in Brentano's use of the term) or reflection is concerned in the formation of many different sorts of conscious phenomena -of all, in fact, whose distinguishing feature is conscious discrimination; and in the production of these same phenomena other operations, such as association, are involved as well.
Let me suggest a view aiming to meet this criticism. The fundamental processes or functions of consciousness, as I conceive them, consist of all radically different operations required to account for FUNDAMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 321 the particular phenomena ofexperience y 1 they should be psychical, not biological functions nor phenotnonon of the material world; and they should together account for all forms of consciousness. From this point of view they need not be each exemplified in a particular phase of consciousness or class of experiences; as a matter of fact they -work together in the production of the various sorts of mental states, the different types of cooperation constituting ' functions' in the usual sense of the term. I will mention in turn the functions which seem to fulfill these conditions.
The first to manifest itself in the evolution of consciousness is Sensibility, which is the basis of all experience, the operation by which conscious experience is brought about, as distinguished from the mere presence of neural or brain activity in the biological organism. Consciousness as it occurs in the lower organisms is simple. Tracing back the course of mental evolution we come to a point where, to judge from all indications, it is wholly undifferentiated. The physical data at this point are simple contacts of the environment; the resulting experience is a mere undifferentiated continuum. This first appearance of consciousness results, as a psychological phenomenon, from the activity of sensibility alone.
Differentiated experience, however simple, requires something more than this. The study of the evolution of consciousness has been hindered by the prominence of the biological processes. We are accustomed to consider each type of experience as something attached to a particular brain center, and to translate the evolution of the former into terms of the latter. But the differentiation of sense organs and of brain centers, the differentiated modes of physiological activity that result, do not accurately represent the differentiation that takes place in consciousness. The latter is a two-fold process, involving two very different functions. Every complex experience is made up of constituent elements which differ either qualitatively or intensively or both. These two sorts of difference existing among elementary experiences require the operation of two distinct functions: one produces quality differentiations of experience, the other intensity modifications. These are fundamental functions of consciousness. In the systematic treatment of psychology, whether analytic or genetic, they should be examined at the outset, and their role (separate or »Cf. article ' Classification' in Baldwin's Did. of Philos. and Psychol. (Vol. I., p. 188) , where it is proposed that we treat 'as ultimate only those general modes which are necessary to constitute any and every concrete conscious state.' 222 HOWARD CROSBY WARREN. joint) in the formation of particular classes of experience should be indicated in the discussion of each class.
The operation of quality differentiation is peculiar, since the quality differences of experiences are something without a counterpart in the physical world. The various sorts of chemical atoms are said to be ' qualitatively different,' and they form compounds which differ in many notable respects from the elements which compose them. But the differences between the elements, and the mutual relations of chemical compounds, can always be expressed in numerical terms of quantity of energy and space relations -the differences in the material world are quantitative, not qualitative. On the other hand, the difference between a sound and a color, as data of experience, has nothing quantitative about it; it is something unique to the world of experience. And the same is true of all sensation qualities. This has been insisted upon by many writers; but the widespread operation of the function in mental life has not been sufficiently recognized. Not a new complex experience arises but entails some qualitative change in the character of the data which compose it. Our state of mind, for instance, when we observe the printed letters m, a, n, side by side, is qualitatively affected by our knowledge of the English language ; our perception of the letter m is something qualitatively different from the experience of an illiterate person viewing this same ink-impression on the paper; and the latter is quite different from the consciousness of a dog on whom the same visual stimulus acts. Quality difference is a difference not expressible in terms of more or less: it is difference of sort. It is a distinctive characteristic of experience, due to the operation of a fundamental function of consciousness. All ' differences of sort,' whether among sensations or complex experiences, can be classed together, I believe, as manifestations of a single function; the alternative is to regard every quality difference as due to a separate function, which would require the presence of a countless number of functions in consciousness.
Intensity differences, which are expressible in terms of more or less, correspond rather closely to the differences that exist in the physical world. Increase and decrease is a mark common to both. And yet the parallel is not complete: quantitative changes in matter or energy arise always through addition or subtraction, while intensity changes in experience are ' internal' changes of the entire experience. The simplest instance of this modification is the rise of intensity differences in sensation, which may be almost if not quite unaccompanied by changes of quality. Usually the two processes cooperate. The
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rise of memory and attention are examples of this: memory elements are of feebler intensity than sensations, but they possess also a peculiar quality of their own ; attention results from the greater importance or ' bigness' of certain elements and a fading of others into ' subconsciousness,' but at the same time there is a quality change in the data, which we call ' vividness.' These examples indicate that intensity change is something fundamentally different from ' change of sort,' and must therefore be due to the operation of a distinct mental function. For convenience I will call the intensity function Modification and the quality function Differentiation. A fourth factor in the development of consciousness is Association. The importance of this process, at least, has been recognized by psychologists; indeed, it will be recalled as the corner-stone of an early school. The mistake of these thinkers lay in over-emphasizing its role, or rather in their failure to appreciate the coordinate importance of other functions. Association requires the existence of two or more experiences at the same time, for even ' successive association > demands the simultaneous presence of the data at the instant of union. The experiences may be either simple or complex; but as the latter are themselves the result of association we have to consider the simple only in determining what is meant by the union of simultaneous experiences into a single state of consciousness. The physiological side offers no difficulty. Different neural centers, excited by stimuli from different parts of the same sense organ, or from different organs, are simultaneously active. These simultaneous physiological processes are brought together by activity in some connecting nerves, and the result is a complex activity. But the psychological standpoint will not allow us to substitute these terms for the processes of consciousness. The various elementary sensations have been accounted for by the functions of differentiation and modification; if two or more such elements occur simultaneously as separate data, they constitute ' split-off ' portions of consciousness. Now, the union of such splitoff or independent experiences into a single complex state can only be accounted for by the operation of a new function of consciousness; and it is to this that the term ' association' is applied.
1
The different forms of association that psychological analysis has discovered (fusion, integration, synthesis, etc.) depend on the nature of the par-J The adoption of the term association instead of combination to denote the function has the sanction of the earliest usage, as instanced in the writings of the Associationists; see, however, the article ' Combination' in Baldwin's Dictionary, Vol. I., p. 198. ticular data and on the manner of differentiation of the compound; the process of uniting the data is the same in all.
The simplest instance of association is found in complex sensations, in which simple experiences belonging to a single sense are united. Experiences, simple or complex, from different senses are combined into perceptions (or percepts) through the same operation. Memory elements are in like manner united, forming imagination images. Usually other functions cooperate with association. Thus the spatial character of perceptions is due to a particular sort of differentiation of certain of the data-the ' local signs.' Complex memory images, or ' memories,' are differentiations of perception -similar to the difference between memory elements and sensations. The division of experiences into presentations, feelings, and impulses rests, as already suggested, on the prominence of data from the external, systemic, and kinaasthetic senses, respectively, in the perception; this is a differentiation of sensation associations along three lines according to the character of the data. Further instances of cooperation are found in normal illusions: illusions of perception are borderline experiences between perception and memory, while illusions of memory are on the borderline between memory and imagination; in each case elements of the two classes are associated, with a new differentiation. Finally, emotions are associations of feelings and impulses.
The four functions so far discussed are sufficient to account for the phenomena of ' unreflective ' mind. This includes both simple differentiated and complex states of consciousness. But the association of differentiated experiences-such as produces perception, for example -does not involve recognition of differences between the constituent elements. This fact of recognition, ' awareness of difference,' or reflection, is due to a further operation of consciousness, of a sort quite different from any of those already considered, which manifests itself relatively late in the course of mental evolution. To this function I would apply the name Discrimination, broadening the application of that term, though in line with its accepted meaning. 1 It constitutes the characteristic feature of both the judgment psychosis and the ' Unterschiedsempfindlichkeit' of experimental psychologists. It is the mark not only of judgment and belief, but of all reflection and self-consciousness. Whatever motor and systemic factors we may trace as its physiological concomitants, the act of discrimination itself is something purely mental, something without physical analogy. It results, as Brentano properly insists, in a new type of experience, which includes the data of perception, memory, and imagination among its constituents, but in which something new is added to these elements. The recognition of differences is not a mere quality change -it is a new sort of change in experience. And the function which produces it deserves quite as much study in systematic psychological analysis as any of the earlier ones.
The operation of discrimination upon perceptions produces apperceptions ; where memories are concerned it produces concepts; where imagination images are concerned it produces ideas. As borderline phenomena between these classes of phenomena we find delusions. Meanings, rational beliefs, and values are particular kinds of differentiation of reflective data: in ordinary cases they are marginal elements attached (by association) to the reflective data; but by further discrimination on these marginal elements new reflective experiences arise. Thus, words and other associated symbolic elements constitute the basis of meaning; meaning itself is produced by a further reflective act on these associations. The traditions of formal logic have obscured the analysis of the 'rational processes.' Rational discrimination acts generally upon concepts, though apperceptions and ' free' ideas may also be its data. The associations which we call rational, whether simultaneous (logical 'judgment') or successive (reasoning), differ from the ordinary ' free' associations in being limited by the so-called ' laws of thought' And this limitation signifies that those associations which reproduce in consciousness the ' consistent' workings of physical nature, have proved in the race history so much more self-consistent, so much further-reaching in the organization of presentative experiences, and so much more useful in their relation to the impulse complexes, that they have come to form a special type of associations. When discrimination appears this difference between ' rational' and ' free ' associations comes to be recognized, and the added element transforms the unreflective rational associations into ' rational beliefs.' The r61e of discrimination in producing the consciousness of values can be traced in much the same way. The transformation of impulse into volition is also the result of discrimination. The imagination of an ' end' of activity may arise before the reflective stage-as an image similar to other images, but resulting physiologically in action which brings about the situation imagined, which situation, in turn, is accompanied by sensations similar to the ' end ' image. But this is still impulsive consciousness; it is transformed into volition only when the end is discriminated from other images -that is, when it becomes a conscious ' purpose.' The transforma-tion of feelings into sentiments can be similarly traced. Finally, the common character of all experience is picked out by an act of discrimination, giving the reflective experience of self, or self-consciousness.
To summarize. The five functions which I have mentionedsensibility, modification, differentiation, association, and discrimination -are fundamental mental processes of different sorts which the data furnished by sensory and central stimuli undergo. Their working together has resulted in the evolution and development of consciousness into the many types and the multitude of complex forms found in human experience. Two of these functions -modification and association -are in a measure similar to phenomena of the material world ; the other three are totally unlike anything outside of consciousness. I give in tabular form the relations between these fundamental functions and the principal classes of experience as indicated in the preceding discussion, following the genetic order of the latter: If the main point of my contention be admitted, the distinction between function and structure in the generally accepted use of those terms seems of relatively small importance. Whether we deal with perception or percepts, memory process or memories, imagination or images, does not affect our analysis. On the other hand, this view makes the fundamental functions of consciousness and the kinds of experience something quite distinct, requiring separate treatment in the psychological analysis. 1 I do not mean to belittle the physiological and physical data that ' underlie ' sensations, nor the nervous processes that ' underlie ' perception, volition, etc. I wish merely to show that the rise of any particular experience and its make-up as a datum of consciousness can be fully described in terms of certain fundamental mental functions, without recourse to neurological terms at all. Regarded from this standpoint, psychology involves physiology only as the latter involves physics and chemistry. The analysis of mental content in terms of essentially mental functions and the tracing of its growth in the same terms afford, I believe, the only solid basis upon which to build an independent natural science of psychology.
